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It is a widespread belief that results like Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems or the intrinsic ran-
domness of quantum mechanics represent fundamental limitations to humanity’s strive for scientific
knowledge. As the argument goes, there are truths that we can never uncover with our scientific
methods, hence we should be humble and acknowledge a reality beyond our scientific grasp. Here, I
argue that this view is wrong. It originates in a naive form of metaphysics that sees the physical and
Platonic worlds as a collection of things with definite properties such that all answers to all possible
questions exist ontologically somehow, but are epistemically inaccessible. This view is not only a pri-
ori philosophically questionable, but also at odds with modern physics. Hence, I argue to replace this
perspective by a worldview in which a structural notion of ‘real patterns’, not ‘things’ are regarded as
fundamental. Instead of a limitation of what we can know, undecidability and unpredictability then
become mere statements of undifferentiation of structure. This gives us a notion of realism that is better
informed by modern physics, and an optimistic outlook on what we can achieve: we can know what
there is to know, despite the apparent barriers of undecidability results.
I. THE PESSIMISTIC VIEW
The early 20th century has given us insights into
mathematics, physics, and computer science that
seemed to shatter our hope for unlimited progress of sci-
entific knowledge. In 1931, Go¨del published his famous
incompleteness theorems [1], implying that every suf-
ficiently complex consistent axiomatic system contains
statements that are true but unprovable within the sys-
tem. An information-theoretic version of this insight is
Turing’s proof of the unsolvability of the halting prob-
lem [2]: there is no algorithm that could, in all instances
and in finite time, decide whether another specified
computation will eventually halt or run indefinitely. At
about the same time, the discovery of quantum physics
has led us to the insight that Nature seems to be intrin-
sically random: even with maximal knowledge of the
current state of the world, it is impossible to predict fu-
ture events with certainty [3].
At first glance, these insights seem to point at limita-
tions of science, suggesting an attitude of humility and
disappointment. Before these results, there was David
Hilbert’s program to reduce all of mathematics to a fi-
nite, complete, provably consistent set of axioms [4].
And there was Pierre-Simon Laplace’s famous declara-
tion [5] of the possibility of a “demon”, able to predict
all of the future with certainty given sufficient physical
data. The new insights were in stark contrast to these
declarations, showing that the hopes of Hilbert, Laplace
and others were misplaced. Does this mean that mathe-
matics and physics are, as scientific disciplines, intrinsi-
cally deficient in some sense?
At least this is the way that these theorems are of-
ten portrayed, both in popular and in academic ac-
counts. Regarding Go¨del’s theorems, Wikipedia [6]
claims: “These results set a limit in principle to mathemat-
ics: not every mathematical theorem can be formally derived
or disproved from the axioms of some area [...] of mathe-
matics.” This proposed limitation of mathematics is of-
ten contrasted to an alleged omnipotence of the human
mind, leading to a class of “anti-mechanist” arguments:
“There have been repeated attempts to apply Go¨del’s theorems
to demonstrate that the powers of the human mind outrun any
mechanism or formal system.” [7]. Philosopher John R. Lu-
cas [8] claims that “given any machine which is consistent
and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula it
is incapable of producing as being true [...] but which we can
see to be true.” (cited in [7]).
If, on the other hand, one gives up on the idea that the
human mind is in some specific sense more powerful
than any mechanism, then it may be tempting to read
Go¨del’s theorem as a fundamental epistemic restriction
for humanity. This view is vividly expressed, for exam-
ple, by Driessen and Suarez [9]:
“In this book, recent mathematical theorems are discussed,
which show that man never will reach complete mathemati-
cal knowledge. Also experimental evidence is presented that
physical reality will always remain partially veiled to man,
inaccessible to his control. It is intended to provide, in the
various contributions, the pieces of a puzzle which restore the
possibility of a natural, intellectual access to the existence of
an omniscient and omnipotent being.”
As the quotation indicates, there is a widespread view
of quantum physics which regards its statistical charac-
ter as a symptom of incompleteness. This view is de-
fended, for example, by proponents of de Broglie-Bohm
theory [10], a nonlocal hidden-variable interpretation of
quantum mechanics. According to this view, there exists
a deterministic underlying reality, and particles have
well-defined positions at any time. However, the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics are probabilistic due to
fundamental uncontrollable disturbances. It is this un-
avoidable lack of experimental control that is ultimately
responsible for the apparent randomness of measure-
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2ment outcomes. According to this view, quantum the-
ory’s statistical character is thus most naturally inter-
preted as manifesting some fundamental epistemic re-
striction.
So has science, in the problems described above, hit
an impenetrable barrier? Let us gain some intuition by
looking at a problem where humanity seemed to hit a
barrier for about two thousand years, before the prob-
lem became finally dissolved.
II. ON AXIOMATIC THEORIES AND
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION
Around 300 BC, in his treatise Elements, Euclid formu-
lated a set of axioms and postulates that were supposed
to capture the essence of geometry [11]. One of these
principles seemed less self-evident than the others and
was hence standing out: Euclid’s fifth postulate, the par-
allel postulate. Could this postulate perhaps be proven as
a consequence of the others? This hope was the source of
a twenty-centuries-long search for a proof, for a logical
deduction of the uniqueness of any parallel line through
any given external point from simpler assumptions.
In the 19th century, this search finally came to an end.
The discovery of nonstandard geometry showed that
the parallel postulate cannot logically follow from the
others. When it became gradually clear that (what we
call today) elliptical and hyperbolic geometries are con-
sistent theories – and these theories satisfy all other prin-
ciples except for the fifth postulate – the parallel postu-
late changed its status from an apparent necessity to a
choice to be made.
?
S
FIG. 1. Absolute geometry and its differentiations.
Denote by T the totality of all of Euclid’s axioms and
postulates (or rather, of Hilbert’s more rigorous refor-
mulation [13]) except for the parallel postulate – we can
see it as a formal system, or theory. But what is this
theory T about? It describes geometric objects – points,
lines, circles, and more – and their relations. It allows us
to prove many interesting statements about these objects
(such as: an exterior angle of a triangle is larger than ei-
ther of the remote angles), but it leaves some questions
undecided that seem natural to ask (is the sum of the
angles in a triangle equal to 180◦?). This theory is some-
times called absolute geometry (see [14] for details).
If we add the parallel postulate to T , we obtain an-
other theory: T1, familiar Euclidean geometry. On the
other hand, we can add suitable modifications of the
parallel postulate to T , and obtain T2 and T3: hyperbolic
and elliptic geometry.
When we talk about a theory in this way, we mean a
systems of axioms equipped with formal rules to gener-
ate theorems, formulated in some language. However,
we typically have a mental picture of the things that the
theory talks about – the “meaning” of the language. Eu-
clidean geometry T1, for instance, is typically not en-
visioned as an abstract language game, but vividly de-
picted as talking about geometric structure: geometric ob-
jects embedded in a plane. The standard mathemati-
cal description of this idea is to say that a theory can
have a model [12]: a set (say, the two-dimensional plane)
equipped with distinguished elements (such as points,
lines, circles), functions, and relations (such as incidence
or congruence) such that the theorems of the theory are
true when understood as talking about these elements.
For what follows, we can take a somewhat different
perspective which is implicitly shared by many prac-
ticing mathematicians, but rarely explicitly communi-
cated. Let us stipulate the following informal definition.
Definition. A structure S is whatever is described by
a consistent theory T .
For example, the structure S1 described by theory T1
corresponds to the objects and relations of Euclidean ge-
ometry – points, lines, their incidences and congruences,
and several others. More formally, we can define a struc-
ture S as the collection of all models of its theory T .
Figure 1 gives a sketch of the geometric structures
mentioned above. Euclidean, hyperbolic and elliptic ge-
ometries S1, S2 and S3 are more differentiated structures
than absolute geometry S: they have all the properties of
S, plus some additional properties. On the other hand,
we can regard S as the collection of all its differentia-
tions S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3, because every model for T1, T2 or T3
is also a model for T .
Definition. Structure S′ is more differentiated than
structure S if its corresponding theory T ′ is an exten-
sion of the theory T — that is, if T ′ contains the same
formal rules and axioms as T , plus additional axioms.
This implies that all models for T ′ are also models for T .
Consequently, a structure is equal to the collection of
all its differentiations.
3The theory T describing absolute geometry is incom-
plete. That is, the question Q “is there more than one line
through any given point parallel to another line?” is unde-
cidable within T : neither the affirmation nor the nega-
tion of this question can be proven in T . However, we
can still regard the corresponding structure S as a per-
fectly valid “thing” in some sense. It is simply the case
that some questions (like Q) that we may ask about this
“thing” don’t have answers. An answer exists for differ-
entiations S1, S2 and S3 of S (no, yes, and no), but no
answer to this question exists for S. And this is how
it must be: since S is the collection of all its differentia-
tions, neither affirmation nor negation1 of Q can be true
for S. In this sense, undecidability of Q in theory T sim-
ply refers to the fact that the corresponding structure S
is undifferentiated with respect to Q. It is a bit like stem
cells of the human embryo, which are undifferentiated
in the sense that the question “what type of cells will
these become?” does not (yet) have an answer.
But should we really regard S as a valid “structure” if
it has these “holes” in its catalogue of properties? Isn’t
S a defective thing, since the corresponding theory T is
defective, i.e. incomplete?
If we decided to throw out S on the basis of T ’s incom-
pleteness, then we would quickly run out of interesting
mathematical structures. This is precisely the content of
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem:
“Any consistent theory T within which a certain amount
of elementary arithmetic can be carried out is incomplete; i.e.,
there are statements of the language of T which can neither be
proved nor disproved in T .” [7]
Thus (see also [7, Sec. 2.6]), we can obtain new theo-
ries T ′ and T ′′ by adding an unprovable statement or its
negation as a new axiom to T . This means that the cor-
responding structure S has (at least) two inequivalent
differentiations, S′ and S′′ – similarly as absolute geom-
etry has elliptic and hyperbolic (and Euclidean) geome-
tries as differentiations. Calling a structure “interesting
enough” if its theory T admits the necessary amount of
arithmetic to be formalized for Go¨del’s theorem to ap-
ply, we arrive at the following consequence:
Theorem. Every interesting enough structure has sev-
eral inequivalent differentiations.
Intuitively, and perhaps traditionally, we tend to think
of the mathematical world as consisting of “mathemat-
ical objects” with a catalogue of statements that are on-
1 Note that this does not violate the law of the excluded middle. The
statementA∨¬A (forA the answer toQ) is still true for S, precisely
because it holds for all its differentiations.
tologically either true or false. For example, we may be-
lieve that there is something called “the natural num-
bers”, N, a well-established “thing” (after all, formal-
ized as a set) that somehow “sits there”, waiting for our
mathematical tools to discover all of its properties and to
prove all of its true theorems. Since mathematicians are
only human, as this informal argument goes, all they can
do is resort to theories T that try to capture the essence
of N (such as the Peano axioms), and to use these the-
ories to prove results about N. According to this view,
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem is bad news: it im-
plies that there will always be statements about N that
are true, but that cannot be proven by our best theory.
The terminology established above allows us to take a
different perspective on the Platonic world. If we visual-
ize the mathematical world as consisting of structure in
the above sense, then Go¨del’s first incompleteness the-
orem attains a quite different, more optimistic interpre-
tation: proving the undecidability of a statement is not
a certificate of principled human fallibility, but a deep
insight into the existence of several distinct differentiations
of some structure. It is not a fundamental limit to what
we can know, but a precious piece of knowledge about
a non-property of the structure that we have discovered.
III. THE PHYSICAL WORLD: EVERY THING MUST GO
Modern physics, as I will now argue, informs us that a
similar move should be considered regarding our phys-
ical world. Consider the historical notion of the luminif-
erous aether. For several centuries, it was believed that
light waves need a material medium for propagation,
similarly as water waves. It was therefore natural to ask:
What are the properties of aether? How can we experimentally
verify its existence and its properties?
The historical course of events is well-known. After
the exploration of light revealed more and more implau-
sible properties of aether, the Michelson-Morley experi-
ment and the subsequent development of Special Rela-
tivity has finally led the physics community to abandon
this notion. This turn of events meant that the inability
to answer the questions above (what are the properties
of aether?) was not due to experimental limitations, but
due to the fact that the questions have no answers. In other
words: the questions were not solved, but dissolved.
The aether and its properties is by far not the only
problem of physics with the final fate of dissolution.
Consider the following question:
Did events A and B happen at the same time?
This is a very natural question with many highly rel-
evant instances. For example, did homo sapiens and homo
erectus inhabit Southeast Asia at the same time? Ques-
tions like this are immensely important for understand-
ing our human ancestry [15]. Did the suspect arrive at his
hotel room at the same time that the victim was killed in the
4bar? The answer may well determine whether the sus-
pect is sent to prison.
Even though we can (hopefully) answer the question
with enough effort in the cases just described, Special
Relativity tells us that we cannot obtain an answer in all
instances. But is this due to a limitation of our exper-
imental abilities? No. According to Special Relativity,
it is because the above question doesn’t have an answer. It
is only that in the cases of interest (such as the two just
described), the question is implicitly asked relative to a
predetermined frame of reference. Based on Newtonian
mechanics, we thought that a general, absolute answer
to this question should always exist, we we have found
that it doesn’t.
The dissolution of questions tends to provoke consid-
erable resistance. This is even true for well-established
insights like the relativity of simultaneity, as the follow-
ing quotation by philosopher and logician Peter Geach
([16], cited in [17]) demonstrates: “[...] ‘at the same time’
belongs not to a special science but to logic. Our practical
grasp of this logic is not to be called into question on account
of recondite physics [...] A physicist who casts doubt upon it
is sawing off the branch he sits upon”.
If such well-established instances of dissolution like
the absence of absolute simultaneity provoke resistance,
then it should not come as a surprise that such hesita-
tion is particularly strong in the context of our second
revolution of modern physics: quantum theory.
Quantum theory claims that there are questions that
we may be interested in asking, but that we will never
be able to answer, no matter what heavy artillery of
physical methods we roll out. If we decide to prepare
a quantum state in the superposition |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
and measure, we may be interested to know beforehand
whether we will obtain outcome |0〉 or |1〉. But if quan-
tum theory is correct, then this desired prediction is im-
possible. It is as rock solid impossible [21] as it is impos-
sible to absolutely decide, in the regime of Special Rela-
tivity, whether two events A and B happened simulta-
neously.
Let us reformulate this observation of unpredictabil-
ity. The question that turns out to be unanswerable is
arguably best characterized as follows:
What is, at some given moment, the actual configuration
of the world?
There are different ways to understand this question,
depending on what we mean by an “actual configura-
tion”. In the foundations of quantum mechanics, this
notion is often understood in a particular way: as a
collection of values of ordinary variables that resem-
ble what John Bell has called “beables” [18]. If such
beables exist, and if they determine the outcomes of
quantum measurements, then it is in principle impos-
sible for us to get to know them all. These hypothetical
“hidden variables” are not only epistemically inaccessi-
ble, but they also have properties that seem implausible.
For example, by Bell’s theorem, these hidden variables
must be nonlocal in some sense; the way that they mani-
fest themselves in measurements on entangled quantum
states must necessarily involve superluminal signalling,
but this signalling is miraculously washed out (“fine-
tuned” [19]) so that it does not show up in the workings
of our devices.
De Broglie-Bohm theory consists precisely of an at-
tempt to answer the above question with an interpre-
tation of the “actual configuration” of the world as just
described. But also some proponents of ψ-epistemic in-
terpretations [24, 29] (what kind of hidden variables with
what kind of causal structure give rise to quantum states as
states of knowledge?) or QBism [26] (what kind of partic-
ipatory real world gives rise to quantum states as rational
states of belief?) are strongly motivated by versions of this
question. Arguing by analogy, we can characterize the
situation in the structure terminology of Section II as fol-
lows. Quantum mechanics, as it is used in actual scien-
tific practice, corresponds to some structure S. Bohmi-
ans claim that the world actually corresponds to a struc-
ture S′ that is more differentiated than S, carrying un-
verifiable2 answers to questions like “where is the elec-
tron exactly, right now?”. Supporters of epistemic views
in the sense above state as their goal to discover the cor-
rect differentiation S′.
The structure terminology suggests an obvious alter-
native: perhaps the question simply doesn’t have an answer.
The urge to claim that it does, but that we are unable
to find it, is arguably motivated by a metaphysics of
“things”. Similarly as our example of the natural num-
bers N in Section II, such a view of the world depicts
the universe as a collection of objects, or as a thing in it-
self, that “sits there” in an infinitely differentiated form.
Similarly as a material body cannot not have a weight, or
a coin cannot not show heads or tails, we tend to take it
as an analytic truth that the world cannot not be in some
configuration. But if we see the world not as a thing, but
as structure in some sense, then we may well accept the
possibility that it corresponds more accurately to struc-
ture S than to any of its differentiations:
Interpretation. Modern physics has shown us that
some apparent properties of the world are actually non-
properties: they correspond to questions that do not have
an answer.
While Go¨del’s results are not directly applicable to
the physical world, they motivate a use of the structure
terminology to interpret this phenomenon by analogy.
Structure manifests itself by, and weaves together, “real
patterns” [22] (such as correlations in measured data).
Structure can be more or less differentiated. Structural
undifferentiation means that there are questions that have
no answers, or that there are less patterns than expected.
Apart from dissolving the question above, what else
do we gain from a “structural” perspective? In some
5cases, the claim that a question doesn’t have an answer
can have surprising predictive power. As an example,
consider device-independent quantum cryptography [23].
Two agents (Alice and Bob) perform local measurements
on entangled quantum states. They use the random, cor-
related outcomes to generate a secret key. Could there
be an eavesdropper (Eve) that spies on their message? If
Alice’s and Bob’s statistics violates a Bell inequality, then
the answer must be “no”. Namely, if Eve is constrained
by locality, and the setup violates local realism, then what
remains is a phenomenal violation of realism: Eve can-
not be correlated to any “elements of reality” in her past
that would correspond to that secret key. In other words:
you cannot spy on something that doesn’t exist.
But the predictive power of this kind of reasoning
seems to come at a price: aren’t we giving up on real-
ism here?
IV. ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM
In the context of quantum physics, the word “realism”
is ambiguous and overloaded. The violation of a Bell in-
equality implies a violation of local realism, but these no-
tions are defined in a very specific way. Interpretations
of quantum theory that reject the violation of locality are
often labelled as “anti-realist” [24]. But this includes in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics that simply reject
the mathematical framework on which the derivation
is built in the first place (the ontological models frame-
work [25]), even if they rest on a generally realist view
of the physical world. A prominent example is given by
QBism [26] that subscribes to a notion of “participatory
realism”.
In particular, to be a realist doesn’t commit one to
a metaphysics of “things” – perhaps quite on the con-
trary. This is the main point in a book by Ladyman et al.
with the title of the previous section: Every Thing Must
Go [17]. The authors argue precisely for a form of real-
ism relying on a metaphysics of structure, not things –
ontic structural realism.
The goals of Ladyman et al. are quite different from
those of this essay – they are mostly motivated by the
problems of standard scientific realism: “[...] the history
of successful novel prediction science is the most compelling
evidence for some form of realism, but [...] the history of on-
tological discontinuity across theory change makes standard
scientific realism indefensible.”
In particular, what is rejected is the ‘doctrine of con-
tainment’: “On this doctrine, the world is a kind of container
bearing objects that change location and properties over time.
These objects cause things to happen by interacting directly
2 Note that this characterization does not apply to Valentini’s version
of de Broglie-Bohm theory [20], which includes the possibility to
have quantum nonequilibrium systems that make predictions which
differ from standard quantum mechanics.
with one another. [...] they themselves are containers in turn,
and their properties and causal dispositions are to be explained
by the properties and dispositions of the objects they contain
(and which are often taken to comprise them entirely).”
It is argued that this kind of view is in line with hu-
man intuition, but not so much with modern physics:
“we should not interpret science [...] as metaphysically com-
mitted to the existence of self-subsistent individuals. [...] We
will later say that what exists are (‘real’) ‘patterns’. [...] When
we go on to deny that, strictly speaking, there are ‘things’, we
will mean to deny that in the material world as represented by
the currently accepted scientific structures, individual objects
have any distinctive status.”
Such a version of realism is still able to account for
the “no-miracles argument” [27]: that the best expla-
nation of the success of science is that our best scien-
tific theories are at least approximately true. In partic-
ular, it frees us from a problem famously described by
Laudan [28]: if we insist on understanding “approxi-
mate truth” as the property that the central terms of a
scientific theory (such as Dalton’s atoms or Bohr’s elec-
trons) refer to actual entities in the world, then we have
to regard previous physical theories (and thus perhaps
also contemporary ones) as utterly unsuccessful. On the
other hand, if we base realism on a structural ontology
of “real patterns”, then this problem is dissolved, and a
form of stability across theory change is established.
In summary: applying structural terminology to our
understanding of the physical world is not in conflict
with realism, but on the contrary implied by mature ver-
sions of it.
V. QUANTUM-OPTIMISTIC CONCLUSIONS
What can we conclude if we accept the structural view
put forward in this essay? First, interpreting undecid-
ability as undifferentiation of structure arguably ren-
ders “anti-mechanist” views as expressed for example
by Driessen and Suarez [9] implausible. Non-existing an-
swers can neither be found by machines, nor by humans
– nor by gods.
Regarding quantum theory, the structural perspective
seems to bring us closer to views that are often unduly
characterized as anti-realist: views in which quantum
states are states of information about future measure-
ment outcomes (or experiences), but not about some un-
derlying reality [24]. But we do not have to stop here.
Seeing the world as consisting of real patterns inter-
woven by structure, not as a “thing” or a collection of
things, opens up the possibility to reconcile these epis-
temic interpretations with others that regard the quan-
tum state as ontic. Namely, if quantum states are ex-
pressions of knowledge (or belief, or chance), and if the
quantum state “is” the world (or is in the world), then
why not accept the conjunction of both views?
6Hypothesis. The quantum world is probabilistic
structure. In other words, it is not a “thing” or a col-
lection of things, but it is the multitude of statistical pat-
terns and their structural relations that any observer en-
counters in their data.
In [30], I have worked out a concrete version of this
hypothesis in detail. It starts with the claim that the
world is nothing but the determination of the chances
of what happens to any observer next, and derives our
usual picture of a “thing-like” objective world from it.
Regardless of this specific approach, the main message
is one of optimism: seeing unpredictability not as an
expression of a fundamental epistemic restriction, but
as structural undifferentiation admits new fruitful per-
spectives on the world, including ones that drop the
false dichotomy of “ontic” and “epistemic” interpreta-
tions of the quantum state.
In this view, undecidability and unpredictability are
not in themselves sufficient reasons to be pessimistic.
But perhaps this is a dangerous perspective. As Steven
Pinker [31] points out,
Pessimism has been equated with moral seriousness. Cit-
ing the popular naysayers, if you think knowledge can help
solve problems, then you have a “blind faith” and a “quasi-
religious belief” in the “outmoded superstition” and “false
promise” of the “myth” of the “onward march” of “inevitable
progress”.
In the light of Go¨del’s theorems, the epitaph of David
Hilbert’s tombstone in Go¨ttingen is sometimes regarded
as a prototype of a false promise:
We must know. We will know.
Let me therefore conclude this essay with one further
outmoded declaration of blind faith:
We can know what there is to know.
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